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Abstract
The growth in the acquisition cycle time of large defense systems from what was
planned (i.e., schedule growth) creates several issues for defense acquisition managers and
policy makers. These issues include increased likelihoods of cancellations, changes in
requirements, and delays in the fielding of improved combat capabilities and replacements
for legacy systems, which have resulted in further cost and schedule growth. As a result,
Congress, the DoD, and the individual military services implemented several major reforms
to address the cost and schedule growth of weapon systems.
This research presents an empirical model of schedule growth to evaluate the impact
of acquisition reform efforts, defense budget changes, unexpected inflation, and major
contingency operations (war) on schedule growth of major weapon systems. A fixed-effects
panel regression model was utilized to describe the schedule performance (using earned value
data) of the major weapon system programs managed by the Army, Air Force, and Navy
from 1980 to 2002. This research found that unexpected inflation results in increased
schedule growth. In addition, the 2000 revision of the DoD 5000 series accounted for a
reduction in schedule growth. The other examined acquisition reforms—the Packard
Commission of 1986 and the 1993-1996 reform efforts [e.g., the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act of 1994 and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996]—were not correlated with
schedule growth. This lack of a relationship suggests these reforms were not fully
internalized into the Department of Defense’s acquisition process and appear to have not
been successful at limiting schedule growth.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORMS
AND EXTERNAL FACTORS ON SCHEDULE GROWTH OF
DEFENSE WEAPON SYSTEMS

I. Introduction
General Issue
In a recent study of 26 major Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition programs,
the Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2006) found that the development costs of
these programs increased by 37 percent and the acquisition cycle time increased by 17
percent. This growth in the cost and acquisition cycle time (schedule) of large defense
systems creates several issues for defense acquisition managers and policy makers. Due
to limited budgets, cost overruns lead to potential reductions in weapon system quantities
and capabilities and increased budget instability in other programs where funds are taken
in order to pay for the overruns (Czelusniak and Rogers, 1997:62). Similar issues arise
due to schedule growth, including an increased likelihood of cancellation due to
escalating costs and schedule delays (Pinto and Mantel, 1990:273). Additionally, a
longer development schedule allows more opportunities to change (and add to) the
technical requirements for the weapon system (Drezner and Smith, 1990:1). In the
circumstances regarding a replacement weapon system, a growth in the schedule of this
system also extends the planned life of the existing system(s) assuming there is a desire
to maintain that war fighting capability (Reinertsen et al., 2002:8). As a result, additional
operations and support costs are required to maintain the existing system or systems until
the replacement system is fielded (Reinertsen et al., 2002:8).
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Specific Issue
Congress, the DoD, and the individual military services implemented several
major corporate reforms to address the cost and schedule growth of weapon systems
(Hanks et al., 2005:xiv). These reforms usually involved the removal of time-consuming
and costly requirements of the defense procurement process (Hanks et al., 2005:xiv).
These major corporate reforms paved the way for and institutionalized numerous
operational level actions to address one or more of the factors contributing to cost and
schedule growth (Hanks et al, 2005:38). This research focuses on analyzing the schedule
growth aspect.
Several researchers focused on identifying the numerous factors contributing to
schedule growth that are addressed by the operational level actions of the acquisition
reforms. These factors include technical risk (Cashman, 1995; Rodrigues, 2000),
requirements stability (Dawkins, 1987; McNutt, 1998) and planned schedule duration
(Drezner and Smith, 1990; McNutt, 1998). Other researchers evaluated the management
initiatives implemented to address these factors of schedule growth, including
prototyping (Tyson et al., 1992), incentive contracts (Tyson et al., 1992), and
evolutionary acquisition (GAO, 2006). Other studies suggested cost and schedule growth
of acquisition programs can be contributed to additional factors that are primarily
external to the acquisition process. These factors include budget instability (McNutt,
1998), contingency operations (McNutt, 1998; Czelusniak and Rogers, 1997), and
unexpected inflation (Smirnoff, 2006).

2

Research Objective
While researchers (Christensen et al., 1998; Holbrook, 2003; Smirnoff, 2006)
have assessed the impact of acquisition reforms on cost growth, there has yet to be an
empirically rigorous study on the impact of reform efforts on schedule growth.
Accordingly, the primary purpose of this research is to evaluate the effectiveness of
acquisition reform efforts on limiting schedule growth of major DoD weapon systems. In
order to isolate the influences of reforms, this research addresses the extent to which
factors external to the acquisition process are related to schedule growth, specifically
defense budget changes (budget instability), unexpected inflation, and major contingency
operations.
Scope & Methodology
To complete this research, data was collected from the Defense Acquisition
Executive Summary (DAES) reports, which include programmatic and earned value data
for the major acquisition programs for all of the services. More specifically, details
pertaining to the schedule information of the various defense acquisition efforts and
calculations of schedule growth were collected and analyzed. Currently, program
initiation is marked by the entrance into the system development phase (GAO, 2006:6).
Consistent with previous research, these major defense acquisition reforms are modeled
as dummy variables (c.f., Smirnoff, 2006) reflecting (and beginning in) the year in which
the reforms in the revisions to the DoD 5000 series of regulations reflecting the DoD’s
policy on defense acquisition. 1 The impact of the major defense acquisition reforms and

1

Additional information, including rationale regarding the operationalizations utilized in this research, is
provided in Chapter III.
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the previously identified external factors on schedule growth are evaluated using panel
regression consistent with the method described by Smirnoff (2006).

4

II. Literature Review
This chapter examines the literature regarding schedule growth of Department of
Defense (DoD) weapon systems. This chapter begins by describing the principal factors
contributing to schedule growth. This section includes an exploration of several
management initiatives implemented by the DoD to mitigate the risk and impact of many
of these factors on a program’s success. Then, this chapter describes several efforts
initiated by the DoD and Congress to reform weapon system acquisition. This section
also includes a review of the research analyzing the effectiveness of the reform efforts.
Acquisition Reform
As a result of the cost and schedule growth of weapon systems, Congress and the
DoD introduced several reforms to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of the
defense acquisition process (including the laws, regulations, and training) (Hanks et al.,
2005:xiv). These reforms traditionally involved streamlining requirements, speeding up
processes, reducing overhead, and cutting paperwork in order to reduce the bureaucracy
of defense procurement (Hanks et al., 2005:xiv). These large scale corporate reforms
translated into numerous operational level actions to address one or more of the factors
contributing to cost and schedule growth (Hanks et al, 2005:38). The following section
examines these factors and several management initiatives (i.e. the operation level
actions) to mitigate the risk and impact of these factors. An exploration of key
acquisition reform efforts follows, which includes a discussion of the recommendations,
mandated changes, and the research concerning the effectiveness of these corporate
reform efforts.

5

Factors Affecting Schedule Growth
While not as plentiful as the research on cost growth, there have been several
studies regarding the factors affecting schedule growth. 2 While there are myriad
potential factors contributing to schedule growth, it is beyond the scope of this research
to address all of these factors. 3 Nonetheless, several key factors identified in the existing
literature are discussed, including technical risk, requirement changes, and planned
schedule duration.
Technical Risk
Technical risk refers to both the maturity of the technology being incorporated
into the weapon system and the technical complexity of the system’s design (Cashman,
1995:73). The level of technical risk increases when the technology is less mature and
when the design is more complex. This greater technical risk often corresponds with a
greater probability and a greater number of technical problems encountered in the design
and development of the components and systems (Cashman, 1995:74). As a result of the
rework to address the technical issues, the programs experience schedule and cost growth
(Drezner and Smith, 1990:23).
A study by Dawkins (1987) conveyed similar results regarding the influence of
technical risk on schedule delays. Studying delays on forty-eight general building
(instructional facilities, laboratories, aircraft hangars, office buildings, addition projects,

2

Most of the factors affecting schedule growth also contribute to cost growth, including requirements
changes (Drezner et al., 1993), budget instability (Singleton, 1991), technical risk (Drezner et al., 1993),
contingency operations (Czelusniak and Rogers, 1997), and planned schedule duration (Jarvaise et al.,
1996). This chapter alludes to this relationship on several occasions.
3
See Drezner and Smith (1990), Cashman (1995), and Monaco (2005) for an analysis of these additional
factors contributing to schedule growth.
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and warehouse facilities) construction contracts, Dawkins found technical difficulty in
the design as the most significant factor for the delays of the construction projects
(1987:66,69). The DoD’s traditional strategy for acquiring major weapon systems has
been to plan programs that would achieve a big leap forward in capability. This suggests
that there is some inherent technical risk in most DoD weapon system programs because
the needed technologies often are immature, where programs stay in development for
years until the technologies are demonstrated (GAO, 2003:3). Rodrigues (2000:10)
found that those programs allowed to advance further into system development despite
low levels of technical maturity and unproven technologies suffered the effects of this
high technical risk with increased costs and schedule slips.
Requirement Changes
Requirement changes include increases or decreases in the specific capabilities of
the system to be produced. These desired capabilities may change as a result of
availability of a newer technology or changing circumstances, such as programmatic
difficulties, availability of resources, and management direction. The inability to meet
cost, schedule, or technical performance requirements often forces the acquisition
program to suspend requirements, increase funding, or to delay the product (McNutt,
1998:102). For large DoD acquisition projects, if these changes concern the acquisition
program baseline requirements, the schedule delay is exacerbated by the requirement to
go through a similar level of review as the original milestone decision process (McNutt,
1998:102).
While not as influential as technical difficulty, Dawkins found that changes by the
owner did influence delays of the construction projects significantly (1987:66,69). These
7

owner changes are analogous to the requirement changes in DoD acquisition programs.
McNutt (1998:276) found similar results regarding the relative impact of requirement
changes on schedule slips. In a survey of 175 projects, requirement changes ranked third
behind funding instability and technical problems as the reason for a development
program to slip—accounting for approximately one quarter of the total average project
slip of approximately two months per year (McNutt, 1998:276).
Planned Schedule Duration
A program with a longer development schedule has a greater probability of a
schedule delaying event occurring, such as budget changes (McNutt, 1998), technical
problems (Drezner and Smith, 1990), cost overruns (Jarvaise et al., 1996), and
requirement changes (Drezner and Smith, 1990).
A study by Monaco, however, had conflicting results regarding the relationship
between program duration and schedule growth (2005:76). He found the likelihood and
magnitude of a schedule slip decreases as the development duration increases. The
speculated rationale was there were greater opportunities to adjust to a problem in the
program when the program had a longer planned development schedule (Monaco,
2005:106). Unlike the previous studies of schedule growth, Monaco restricted the
analysis to more recent development programs (1990-2003) that were at least three years
into their development phase.

8

Management Initiatives
Several management initiatives were instituted to mitigate the risk and impact
these factors have on program success, specifically in terms of cost and schedule. The
major acquisition reforms (described in greater detail below) institutionalized many of
these management initiative as a part of their efforts to reduced cost and schedule growth.
Many initiatives still remain in some form from their creation; whereas others faded away
in favor of different management initiatives. For example, after 1965, the total package
procurement (TPP) concept was utilized to reduce the cost risks born by the government
by having contractors bid on the development, production, and support work under one
fixed-price contract. TPP was intended to discourage the practice of contractors
submitting low bids for development (in a competition) and then profiting under solesource production contracts. During the early 1970s, however, a number of TPP
programs had large cost overruns, which left some contractors in need of Government
assistance (Tyson et al., 1992:II-2). Similar experiences occurred regarding fixed-price
development contracts (Tyson et al., 1992:X-8). As a result, total package procurement
was discontinued in favor of cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts that placed more risk on
the government (Tyson et al., 1992:II-2).
These incentive contracts were designed to motivate the contractor to meet
desired acquisition objectives while discouraging inefficiency and waste (FAR 16.401a).
Incentive contracts usually include cost objectives, but can also include incentives for
technical or schedule-related performance (FAR 16.401b). Tyson found development
programs with incentive contracts experienced less schedule growth than those programs
without incentive contracts (i.e. fixed-fee contracts) (Tyson et al., 1992:VI-3).

9

Another manner in which the government attempts to manage the risks of
program is through the use of prototyping. Prototyping is designed to reduce technical
risk by building and testing detailed pieces of hardware prior to any large-scale
development (Tyson et al., 1992:V-1). These working models are used to demonstrate a
concept, a specific design, or an operational objective. In order to reduce the potential for
issues in development, potential design problems need to be identified and resolved as
early as possible (Tyson et al., 1992:V-2). In an analysis of tactical aircraft and
munitions from the 1960s to 1989, Tyson found no statistical difference between the
development schedule growth of programs that were prototyped and those that were not
(Tyson et al., 1992:V-3). Overall, prototyped programs took somewhat longer, but the
differences may be due to technical complexity (Tyson et al., 1992:ES-5).
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) and Advanced
Technology Demonstrations (ATD) are prototype efforts that are instrumental in the
initiatives to reduce the acquisition cycle time of weapon systems. These experimental
tools generated a second parallel acquisition process, which give war fighters the
opportunity to assess prototype operational capability prior to formal program initiation
(system development). The objective was to bridge the gap and improve the transition of
Science and Technology (S&T) projects into the formal acquisition process (Vollmecke,
2004:7). As part of technology development, ACTDs and ATDs aim to increase the level
of technical maturity of a technology prior to implementation into a weapon system.
The evolutionary acquisition approach relies upon the availability of mature
technologies to field an operationally useful and supportable capability in as short a time
as possible with the intent to deliver additional capability in the future (Sylvester and
Ferrara; 2003:5-6). Evolutionary acquisition stresses an incremental approach to
10

development, which capitalizes on the best mature technologies available at a given point
in time. Evolutionary acquisition takes advantage of concurrent engineering and reduces
acquisition cycle time by minimizing technical uncertainty at the start of the development
program (Sylvester and Ferrara; 2003:8). The GAO identified this strategy of maturing a
new technology to a high level of technology readiness prior to inclusion in a product as a
commercial industry best practice and a major determinant of the success of new product
launches (Best-Practices, 1999:3).
Evolutionary acquisition is a major shift from the single-step-to-full-capability
acquisition strategy (grand design approach) used extensively for the past 30 years
(Sylvester and Ferrara; 2003:8). The single-step-to-full-capability strategy involves an
identified end state in terms of capability requirements, which the program would attain
in one (usually lengthy) increment (Sylvester and Ferrara; 2003:8). Not surprisingly, in a
2006 study, the GAO contended the DoD was not effectively implementing the
evolutionary approach by continuing to accept high levels of technology risk for
programs entering into system design and development (GAO, 2006:12). Since 2000,
thirteen of the eighteen programs initiated under the revised acquisition policy received
approval to enter system development with immature technologies (GAO, 2006:14).
Key Acquisition Reform Efforts
This section discusses the following acquisition reforms and their potential impact
on schedule execution: the Packard Commission (1986), the National Performance
Review (1993) and Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, and the revision of the
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DoD 5000 series in 2000. 4 These reforms serve as the basis for this research into the
influence of acquisition reforms on schedule growth. In addition, the literature suggests
the selected acquisition reforms were singular in their scope and potential impact on
schedule execution. While additional reforms have been implemented that may have also
impacted schedule growth, an analysis of these reforms is beyond the scope of this
study. 5 The following section provides details regarding these reform efforts, including
the recommendations and initiatives of these reforms, the implementation of these
initiatives and recommendations, and studies evaluating the efficacy of these initiatives.
Packard Commission (1986)
In July 1985, President Reagan instituted the Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management (also known as the Packard Commission) to investigate issues
pertaining to defense management and organization (Blue Ribbon Commission,
1986:27). In order to address the horror stories in the media of excessive prices for parts,
test failures, and cost and schedule overruns, a task force was created to specifically
address the military acquisition process (Munechika, 1997:12). In order to improve the
defense acquisition system, which included improving cost and schedule performance by
limiting overruns and reducing acquisition cycle time, the task force established a
formula for action for the DoD to implement (Blue Ribbon Commission, 1986:15). The
commission recommended stabilizing the programs, balancing cost and performance,
using technology to reduce cost, streamlining acquisition organization and procedures,

4

Due to restrictions in the data obtained for this analysis (from 1980-2002), the revision of the DoD 5000
series in 2003 was excluded from this list of key acquisition reforms.
5
For additional information on other acquisition reform efforts, see Reig (2000), Munechika (1997),
Ferrara (1996), and Vollmecke (2004).
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expanding the use of commercial products, increasing competition, and raising the
quality of acquisition personnel (Blue Ribbon Commission, 1986:52-71).
Congress responded very enthusiastically to the Packard recommendations and, in
short order, enacted the Defense Acquisition Improvement Act of 1986 (Ferrara,
1996:120). In addition, the DoD 5000 series was updated in 1987 to include the Packard
Commission recommendations, including the new streamlined acquisition chain of
command (Ferrara, 1996:120).
A study by McNutt (1998) assessed the impact of the Packard Commission’s
recommendations on schedule execution. Despite implementation by the DoD, he
contended the recommendations on schedule execution were not widely internalized and
appeared to have been unsuccessful (McNutt, 1998:50). His assessment relied on a
visual analysis of the programmatic schedule data and interviews with government and
contractor personnel in the Pentagon, program offices, and contractor facilities. A more
empirical analysis is needed to confirm this assessment of the Packard Commission’s
impact on schedule performance.
Searle (1997), Christensen et al. (1999), and Smirnoff (2006) analyzed the impact
of the Packard Commission recommendations on cost growth. The findings were
inconsistent. Christensen et al. (1999:257) found that cost performance of defense
contracts worsened in the period following the commission. In contrast, Smirnoff
(2006:78) more recently concluded that cost performance improved as a result of the
Packard Commission’s recommendations. These inconsistent results might be attributed
to the methods that were used to analyze the issue. Due to the size and complexity of the
Department of Defense, a large acquisition reform effort would likely take some time to
implement (Reig, 2000:38). In order to address this issue, one method has been for the
13

researcher to identify a treatment date of when they considered reform efforts to be fully
institutionalized in the DoD. Unfortunately, the researcher cannot be certain that this
point in time accurately reflects when a reform is fully implemented. Searle (1997) and
Christensen et al. (1999) used December 31, 1991 as a subjective treatment date for
separating the data into pre- and post-reform. That is, this date represented their
assessment of when the Packard recommendations were fully institutionalized in the
DoD. They utilized statistical tests of the difference between population means of the
two periods to assess the efficacy of the Packard Commission (Searle, 1997:65).
Even if there were no uncertainty around a treatment date, the principal concern
with their studies is the absence of external (control) variables, such as changes in
defense budgets, inflation, or war, might have biased the results of these studies
(Smirnoff, 2006:20). Christensen et al. identified this bias as a potential threat to the
internal validity of their study (1999:262). That is, these acquisition reform efforts might
have resulted in less cost growth, but this relationship could be observed using their
method due to the influence of external, environmental factors.
In order to address the shortcomings of the previous studies, Smirnoff (2006)
utilized panel regression to evaluate the impact of acquisition reform efforts and several
environmental variables on cost growth. The use of panel regression allowed for a more
robust analysis of these factors compared to the use of subjective treatment dates and
statistical tests of the difference between two means, because it showed the relative
importance of each variable and its contribution to cost growth in a dynamic situation
(Smirnoff, 2006:5). Additionally, Smirnoff used the panel regression results to
statistically determine the lag structure (i.e. treatment dates) for the implementation of the
acquisition reform efforts instead of developing a subjective treatment date. Because the
14

reform efforts address many of the common factors of both cost and schedule growth, an
empirical evaluation of schedule growth utilizing a method similar to Smirnoff (2006)
may yield similar results after controlling for external factors. Specifically, whether the
implementation of the acquisition reforms stemming from the Packard Commission
reduced schedule growth.
1993-1996 Reform Efforts
Initiated in March 1993 and led by then-Vice President Gore, the National
Performance Review (NPR) performed a detailed look at all government activities to find
areas for improvement (GAO-NPR, 1999:3). The initial NPR report contained 384
recommendations spanning all aspects of government operations, including federal
procurement. The report identified the need for the DoD to eliminate regulatory burden,
simplify procurement, and rely more on the commercial market (Rogers and
Birmingham, 2004:39).
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) codified many of the
NPR’s recommendations. The FASA was devised to overhaul the cumbersome and
complex procurement system of the federal government. To this end, the act significantly
modified or eliminated over 225 existing statutes (Holbrook, 2003:17-18). The
overarching themes of the FASA included a preference for moving to commercial
contracting methods, transitioning the procurement process to an electronic basis,
eliminating non value-added requirements, and eliminating paperwork burdens in the
procurement cycle (Cooper, 2002:16). The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 further advanced
the changes made by FASA, providing additional opportunities for the DoD to further
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streamline and reduce non-value added steps in the acquisition process (Holbrook,
2003:19).
The National Performance Review (1993), the FASA (1994), and Clinger-Cohen
Act (1996) led to a wave of acquisition management initiatives, including variations of
the previously mentioned management initiatives (e.g. evolutionary acquisition, program
stability, advanced concept technology demonstration). Hanks et al. (2005:38) identified
46 such initiatives that were initiated between 1994 and 1996. In their examination of
these acquisition management initiatives, Hanks et al. grouped these reform initiatives
into five themes:
- Rationalizing and improving the industrial base
- Streamlining
- Civilian-military integration
- Logistics transformation and total life-cycle system management
- Reducing fraud, waste, and abuse (Hanks et al., 2005:122-124)
More than half of these acquisition management initiatives focused on ways to streamline
the acquisition process, which often meant relaxing some of the controls established in
the 1980s to guard against fraud, waste, and abuse (Hanks et al., 2005:16).
Most of these initiatives were instituted in the 1996 revision of the DoD 5000
series. The 1996 version reflected how the acquisition system responded to the changing
global environment since the end of the Cold War. Due to the uncertainty of where and
when threats to the United States could come, the acquisition system needed the
flexibility to be able to respond very quickly (Ferrara, 1996:123). The 1996 version
instituted Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations in order to infuse new
technology into the process (Ferrara, 1996:123).
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) were also institutionalized under this revision.
The purpose of IPTs was to breakdown the barriers between different organizations and
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acquisition disciplines and to encourage integrated solutions to management problems
(Ferrara, 1996:123). The 1996 revisions also added the management concept of cost as
an independent variable, which involves making cost more of a constraint and less of a
variable. As a result, tradeoffs were made between performance requirements and lifecycle costs in order to meet cost objectives (Hanks et al., 2005:92). Additionally, the
revision included strategies to reduce expensive testing, in terms of time and money,
through the use of modeling and simulation. Finally, the 1996 revision significantly
reduced the amount of paperwork as compared to the previous (1991) version by
canceling numerous previously mandated report formats (Ferrara, 1996:127).
Similar to the studies of the effectiveness of the Packard Commission’s
recommendation, studies on the impact of the 1993-1996 reform efforts yielded
conflicting results. The National Performance Review (NPR) claimed its efforts to
reinvent the government generated $137 billion in savings between 1993 and 2000
(GAO-NPR, 1999:1). A study by the GAO contended this number was exaggerated,
because the NPR figure took credit for all of an agency’s savings (compared to a
baseline) over that time period, even the savings resulting from separate reform initiatives
that were consistent with the NPR principles of reinventing government (GAO-NPR,
1999:1-2). Due to the complexity and time required, the GAO did not calculate the
actual savings that were solely attributable to the NPR recommendations (GAO-NPR,
1999:1). These studies did not assess the impact of the NPR recommendations on
schedule growth.
Smirnoff found the passing of the FASA corresponded with reduced cost growth
regardless of contract type (2006:73). Holbrook contended the FASA and the ClingerCohen Act did not have an impact on cost growth; however, he utilized a subjective
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treatment date of December 31, 1997, for his analysis and did not control for the potential
influence of any external factors (2003:91). As a result, his study suffers from the same
limitations as those found in the studies by Searle (1997) and Christensen et al. (1999) on
the impact of the Packard Commission recommendations on cost growth.
As a result of the focus by researchers on cost growth--specifically the
effectiveness of DoD policies and reform initiatives on controlling cost growth--there has
yet to be a study assessing the impact of the NPR, FASA, or the Clinger-Cohen Act on
schedule growth. Many of these acquisition reform initiatives were aimed at addressing
the underlying causes of cost and schedule growth, such as reducing the technical risk
and ensuring requirements stability, that add unplanned work to the development effort.
As a result, an empirical analysis of the impact of these acquisition reform efforts on
schedule growth may produce results consistent with the studies concerning cost growth.
DoD 5000 Revision (2000)
The 2000 revision codified many of the initiatives that were developed under the
wave of acquisition reform efforts in the mid-to-late 1990s but not yet integrated into the
DoD 5000 series. One of the more significant initiatives, in terms of its potential
influence (assuming proper implementation) on schedule performance, was evolutionary
acquisition. The 2000 revision made evolutionary acquisition the preferred DoD strategy
for rapid acquisition of mature technology for the user (Hawthorne, 2003:np).
Due to the relatively recent focus on evolutionary acquisition and challenges in
implementing the strategy (GAO, 2006), there has yet to be an empirical evaluation of the
impact of evolutionary approaches on DoD weapon systems acquisition. However, the
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success of commercial efforts using a similar approach suggests evolutionary acquisition,
when properly implemented, may provide its theoretical benefits (GAO, 2006:1). 6
External Factors (Control Variables)
In addition, the existing literature suggests several factors that are primarily
external to the defense acquisition process. In order to alleviate the omitted variable
issues in the previous studies of acquisition reforms and cost growth, external factors are
included as control variables in this research of the efficacy of acquisition reform efforts
to limit schedule growth. The following section details the external factors affecting
schedule growth and the corresponding research of these factors.
Budget Instability
A program’s requirements are often modified as a result of adjustments to the
program’s budgets (current and projected) (McNutt, 1998:188). The schedule of planned
work to be performed on a program assumes a certain amount of funding across
numerous years. When this funding is altered, the program is faced with a decision to
reduce requirements or to obtain additional funding in another (typically later) year and
stretch out the program. Technical performance requirements, however, are less likely to
be changed than the length of the schedule (McNutt, 1998:188). In a 1998 survey of 205
personnel at the Pentagon and various program offices, 113 stated that the schedule was
more likely to change than performance requirements; whereas, only 46 stated

6

On October 30, 2002, a memorandum issued by Paul Wolfowitz, the then-Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, cancelled the current DoD 5000 series of regulations (Rogers and
Birmingham, 2004:46). An interim guidance was put in place until the revised DoD 5000 series was issued
in 2003, which is the current version. Several of the key initiatives implemented in the 2000 revision
remained, specifically evolutionary acquisition.
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performance requirements would more likely change—a statistically significant
difference (McNutt, 1998:287-288). A similar statistically significant difference existed
in the tradeoff of cost and schedule where the schedule was more likely to be extended
(McNutt, 1998:288).
In addition, McNutt (1998:276) surveyed government and contractor personnel at
the Pentagon, program offices, and contractor facilities representing 175 projects.
Results indicated that funding instability was the primary reason for a development
program to slip—accounting for one month of the total average project slip of
approximately two months per year (McNutt, 1998:276). Although there were some
limitations with McNutt’s method (i.e., it was a retrospective look that could be
influenced by errors in recall), the individuals that were surveyed were closer to the
projects than outsiders. Additionally, the individuals involved in the study were those
that would be updating higher headquarters and Congress on the program’s status.
Contingency Operations
Existing research has conflicting results concerning the influence of contingency
operations on schedule growth, depending on the immediacy of the need for the weapon
system. One side suggests the needs of contingency operations require systems,
especially those in or near production, to be fielded sooner so that the capability is
available to the war fighters (McNutt, 1998:40). As a result, those weapon systems
identified as requirements for contingency operations are expected to have less (or
negative—fielded prior to original plan) schedule growth.
The other side addresses those programs not specifically required or hastened due
to contingency operations. Czelusniak and Rodgers found that Congressional decisions
20

to shift funds to near-term priorities external to these programs (e.g. unplanned
contingency operations) accounted for up to one-half of the cost growth in major
weapons systems (1997:59). Their analysis, however, did not extend into the effects on
schedule growth. The expectation is that the funding needs related to contingency
operations (including the accelerated programs) contribute to budget instability in the
programs not identified as contingency requirements. This budget instability leads to
schedule growth as previously discussed. Therefore, the analysis of the influence of
budget instability on schedule growth would necessitate accounting for the instability
resulting from contingency operations.
Unexpected Inflation
Cost estimates for major programs span the entire life cycle of the program from
initiation to disposal, which can last for numerous decades into the future. The
development phase of these programs alone spans numerous years. These cost estimates
included an estimate of inflation provided by the OSD Comptroller. If inflation is
unexpectedly high in a given year then that forecasting error could contribute to cost
overruns. There has yet to be an analysis of the impact of unexpected inflation on
schedule growth; however, an analysis has been performed concerning cost growth.
A study by Smirnoff (2006:64) did not find a statistically significant relationship
between unexpected inflation and cost overruns of procurement or development
contracts. Additionally, the lack of a relationship between unexpected inflation and cost
overruns may be due to the tradeoffs of reduced performance requirements or extended
schedules.
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Summary
This chapter examined the principal factors affecting schedule growth of
Department of Defense (DoD) weapon systems. This chapter reviewed the major
acquisition reforms with the scope and potential to impact schedule execution of defense
acquisition efforts, which included a review of the research that assessed the efficacy of
these reforms. Additionally, the literature identified funding instability, unexpected
inflation, and contingency operations as external factors potentially contributing to
schedule growth. This research on the efficacy of acquisition, however, has primarily
been focused on cost growth. This research provides the lacking empirical analysis of the
influence of the acquisition reform efforts and external factors on schedule growth.
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III. Data and Methods
This chapter details the methods used in this research, including a discussion of
the operationalization of variables, the data analyzed, and the analytical techniques
utilized in order to address the purpose of this research. More specifically, this chapter
discusses the empirical model that was developed, and data that was collected, to
evaluate the efficacy of acquisition reform efforts on limiting schedule growth of major
DoD weapon systems. This model also addresses the influence of factors external to the
acquisition process on schedule growth, including changes in defense budgets,
unexpected inflation, and contingency operations.
The relationships between the dependent variable (schedule growth of DoD
weapon systems) and the independent variables (acquisition reforms, contingency
operations, unexpected inflation rates, and budget changes) is evaluated using panel
regression. In addition to the discussion of the variables and the corresponding data, this
chapter discusses the advantages of the use of panel regression in cross-sectional timeseries analysis.
Programs
This research evaluates the schedule growth of major defense acquisition
programs (MDAPs) that are categorized as acquisition category (ACAT) I programs.
These programs are designated as ACAT I programs due to their estimated cost
exceeding a threshold or due to special interests (by the DoD or Congress) in the program
(DoD5000.2, 2003:np). This cost threshold is currently $355 million in fiscal year (FY)
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1996 constant year dollars for system development or $2.135 billion in FY 1996 constant
dollars for production (DoD5000.2, 2003:np). That is, if the estimated expenditures for
the program exceed either of those thresholds, the acquisition program is considered an
MDAP and categorized by the milestone decision authority as an ACAT I program.
Highly sensitive, classified programs (as determined by the Secretary of Defense) are not
included among the MDAPs due to their sensitive nature (DoD5000.2, 2003:np). These
programs receive special designations and are reported separately. As a result, this
research excludes classified programs from the analysis and concentrates on the ACAT I
major defense acquisition programs. Each of the military services is represented among
the major defense acquisition programs. Among these MDAPs are joint programs, which
are designated by the lead service for the joint program, such as the Air Force being the
lead service for the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) program.
As a result of being designated an ACAT I major defense acquisition program,
these programs are required to submit quarterly submissions of the program’s status into
the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) database. The DAES database
includes Earned Value Management (EVM) data based on information supplied to the
government by the performing contractor. EVM allows the government and contractors to
monitor the status of programs with regard to contract costs and schedule by comparing the
actual cost for work performed, the budgeted cost for work performed, and the budgeted cost
for work scheduled. Due to the validation of the EVM accounting systems by the
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government, the data produced by these systems is considered to be valid (Searle, 1997:42).
The period of analysis utilized in this research is from 1980 to 2002. 7

This resulting sample DAES database is separated based on service and phase of
the program—research and development (R&D) or procurement (proc.). The number of
entries corresponding to a specific contract’s EVM data is presented in the table below.
An excerpt from the DAES database, a list of programs, and the number of contract
entries per program is provided in Appendix A.
Table 1: Number of Contract Entries in Sample DAES Database
R&D - Contract Entries
Proc. - Contract Entries

Air Force
1,998
2,172

Army
1,194
792

Navy
1,303
2,893

Total
4,495
5,857

Measures
Outcome (Dependent Variable)
Schedule Growth
For the purposes of this research, schedule growth is defined and measured using
a modified version of percent schedule variance based on the Earned Value Management
Gold Card (2007). 8 The following formula is used to calculate these values for
percentage schedule growth of both development and production contracts:

7

This research utilizes the DAES database utilized in Smirnoff (2006), which extended from 1970 to 2002. This
database, however, did not include data for one of the dependent variables (unexpected inflation) prior to 1980
due to the unavailability of inflation estimates. In order to mitigate any potential confusion with a discussion of
varying beginning dates, this research focuses all discussions/graphical presentations on the time period from
1980 to 2002.
8
The actual calculation for schedule variance according the EVM Gold Card is BCWP-BCWS, which results in
negative values reflecting undesired circumstances. In this research, the variables were switched to allow for
positive values to reflect percent schedule variance (also referred to as schedule growth throughout this study).
This adjustment allows for easier interpretation and analysis of the empirical model coefficients.
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% Schedule Growth for service i in year t =

( ∑ BCWSi ,t −∑ BCWPi ,t )
*100
∑ BCWSi ,t

(1)

where: BCWS = Budgeted Cost for Work Scheduled
BCWP = Budgeted Cost for Work Performed
This equation aggregates the values by year, service, and program phase for all of the
DAES contracts entries/years from 1980-2002. The next chapter presents a visual
representation of the schedule growth for both development and production contracts.
A potential limitation of this operationalization of schedule growth is that it does
not decipher between legitimate delays caused by DoD decisions, such as changing
requirements, and delays caused by contractor performance. The majority of the delays,
however, cannot be attributed to contractor actions, such as when the DoD calls for
performance requirements that represent a high technical risk or when the government
(either Congress or the DoD) chooses to shift financial resources creating funding
instability (Drezner and Smith, 1990:35; McNutt, 1998:275). Despite the source of the
delay, the issues resulting from schedule growth remain, including an increased
probability of cancellation (Pinto and Mantel, 1990:273) and costs associated with
maintaining existing systems (Reinertsen et al., 2002:8).
Antecedents (Independent Variables)
Acquisition Reform
The acquisition reforms that are studied in this research include the Packard
Commission, the 1993-1996 reforms (NPR, FASA, and the Clinger-Cohen Act), and the
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2000 revision of the DoD 5000 series of regulations. In accordance with previous
research, these reforms are coded as dummy variables with a “1” indicating the presence
of the reform (Smirnoff, 2006:28-29). This research utilizes the year in which the DoD
revised its DoD 5000 series of regulations as the first year of the presence of these
reforms. A common thread throughout the selected reforms is that the DoD 5000 series
was revised soon after these acquisition reform efforts were codified (e.g., the ClingerCohen Act) or the study recommendations published (e.g., the Packard Commission).
These revisions point to changes in acquisition policy made by the DoD as a result of
these major reform efforts, which would affect all of the current programs including the
major defense acquisition programs.
In accordance with this coding scheme, the Packard Commission
recommendations are coded as “1” from 1987 to 1995. The 1987 date reflects when the
DoD revised its acquisition policy (DoD 5000 series) to incorporate the
recommendations. The 1993-1996 reforms and corresponding management initiatives
were integrated into the 1996 revision of the DoD 5000 series; as a result, these reforms
are coded as “1” from 1996 to 2002. In addition, these reforms superseded many of
reform initiatives/recommendations of the Packard Commission, which is why the
Packard Commission ends at 1995. Finally, the 2000 revision of the DoD 5000 series is
coded as “1” from 2000 to 2002 (the last year of analysis in this research).
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External Factors
Budget Instability
This research utilized the actual procurement and development budgets as a proxy
measure for budget instability. Budget instability was measured by utilizing the constant
year budget figures detailed in Chapter 6 of the National Defense Budget Estimates for
2006 (also known as the FY2006 Greenbook). The budget information in this report was
collected for each service (Air Force, Army, Navy), for each appropriation (research and

development and procurement), and for each year of the analysis (1980-2002). A visual
representation of the resulting values is presented in Appendix B.
Contingency Operations
This research codes contingency operations as a binary (dummy) variable, in
which the values of “1” correspond to the existence of major combat operations (war) in
a given year to account for the influence of the contingency operations on schedule
growth of major defense acquisition programs. These major combat operations are more
likely to impact major defense acquisition programs, either through budget instability as
suggested by Czelusniak and Rogers (1997) or through the needs of combatant
commanders hastening programs in order to support the contingency operations as
suggested by McNutt (1998). Therefore, for the time period of 1980 to 2002, the
identified major contingencies (where the war dummy variable is coded as “1”) were
Desert Storm/Shield and the Global War on Terror (Smirnoff, 2006:29).
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Unexpected Inflation
The OSD Comptroller provides estimates of future inflation rates that the cost
estimators incorporate into their estimates for major defense programs. These estimates
of future inflation rates are presented in Chapter 5 of the National Defense Budget
Estimates section included in the annual President’s Budget submission. This research
measures unexpected inflation as the difference between actual inflation and expected
inflation for the year the funding was used (Smirnoff, 2006:31). The following formula
is used to calculate the values for unexpected inflation:

Unexpected Inflation = Inflation actual - Inflation estimated

(2)

For example, the expected inflation rate for the DoD in 1980 was 5.9 percent, but the
actual inflation rate for 1980 was 11.7 percent. As a result, there was 5.8 percent of
unexpected inflation for 1980. This level of unexpected inflation was calculated for each
year from 1980-2002 to correspond with the span of the schedule growth data. A visual
representation and a table of the calculated unexpected inflation values are included in
Appendix B.
Analysis
The influence of the major defense acquisition reforms and the external factors
(budget instability, contingency operations and requirements, and unexpected inflation)
on schedule growth is empirically evaluated using panel regression. Panel regression is
utilized to analyze an independent variable across groups with respect to multiple time
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periods. In terms of this research, the groups represent each service and the time periods
correspond to the years 1980-2002.
Panel (data) analysis provides several benefits when compared to other possible
analytical methods, such as multivariate regression analysis of cross-sectional data.
Panel regression provides the ability to control for omitted variables. The bias resulting
from omitted variables is typically an issue with multivariate analysis. This issue stems
from unknown variable or variables affecting the dependent variable, which leads to
biased estimations (regression results) (Kennedy, 2003:302). The issue of omitted
variables represented the principle limitation in the previous studies of acquisition
reforms and cost growth (Christensen et al., 1999; Holbrook, 2003). The ability of panel
regression to control for these omitted variables is a key benefit to this analytical method.
In addition, the combining of cross-sectional and time-series data creates more
observations for statistical testing and produces more variability, which makes the panel
model more robust to multicollinearity (Kennedy, 2003:302).
This research utilizes a fixed-effects specification for the panel model consistent
with that utilized by Smirnoff (2006). Fixed-effects panel regression assumes there are
nominal time-series impacts on the dependent variable, but more cross-sectional effects
(Armstrong, 2006:34). Smirnoff’s study similarly evaluated the impact of acquisition
reforms and additional (economic) variables on major defense acquisition programs using
a fixed-effects panel model; however, his analysis focused on the impacts on cost growth.
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Summary
This research empirically evaluates the influence of defense acquisition reforms
and external factors (budget instability, contingency operations, and unexpected inflation)
on schedule growth of major defense acquisition programs between 1980 and 2002. This
chapter described the how the dependent variable (schedule growth percentage) and
independent variables were operationalized and measured, including the corresponding
rationale. In addition, a description of the key source of information pertaining to the
major defense acquisition programs, the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary
(DAES) reports, was presented. Finally, this chapter described the analytical method that
was utilized to analyze the relationship between the independent variables and schedule
growth. The results of the panel analysis are presented in the next chapter.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the analysis performed in order to address the purpose of
this research. The first section includes details regarding the theoretical models utilized
to analyze the collected data. Following that section, the results of these empirical
models are presented, including a discussion of the key findings. This discussion
includes addressing the findings that yielded results contrary to the expected (based on
previous research) and the variables that were more significant (statistically and in the
magnitude of the coefficients) than the other variables.
Theoretical Model
The existing research suggests the below theoretical model for evaluating the
relationship of the previously discussed factors on schedule growth:
⎛ Budget Stability, Unexpected Inflation, ⎞
Schedule Growth (%) = f ⎜
⎟
⎝ Acquisition Reforms, War
⎠

(3)

The data concerning these variables were collected and coded according the methods
described in the previous chapter. As mentioned previously, a cross-sectional fixedeffects panel model was utilized for this analysis. The general form of this panel model,
where i represents the service and t represents the year, is: 9

9

An alternate model specification included the percent change in the budget variables. This specification,
however, created challenges in the interpretations of the findings, specifically in the applications of the
coefficients to real-world examples. As a result, the actual budgetary figures were utilized. In addition, the
total budget for each service was excluded due to its high correlation with both the development and
procurement budgets, which are the primary sources of funding for major acquisition programs.
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Schedule Growth (%)i,t = α +α i +β1*R&D Budget i,t +β 2 *Procurement Budget i,t +
β 3 *Unexpected Inflation i,t +β 4 *Packardi,t + β 5 *90s Reformsi,t +
β 6 *2000 Revision i,t +β 7 *Wari,t +ei,t

(4)

This panel model includes the aforementioned cross-sectional fixed-effects to
account for the service specific characteristics in the sample data. In addition, several
other considerations were addressed in the modeling process. In order to minimize the
possibility for spurious correlations, the dependent variable (percent schedule growth)
was tested for stationarity using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for each panel
(service). The results of these tests (in Appendix C) suggest the existence of a stationary
process. 10
Another consideration tested for in the panel models was autocorrelation, which
can bias the regression results. Specifically, it can lead to an upward bias in the estimates
of the statistical significance of coefficient estimates (Schmidt, 2003:223). In order to
address this issue, a first-order autocorrelation component was included in the empirical
models. 11
An additional concern for the models was heteroskedasticity (non-constant
variance in the residuals), which can also bias the standard errors of the parameter
estimates (Schmidt, 2003:247). In order to mitigate the potential heteroskedasticity, the
residuals were ‘White-washed’ using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent variancecovariance matrix (White, 1980) to obtain robust standard errors.

10

Additional tests of stationarity corroborated these results, specifically the Levin, Lin and Chu test for a
common unit root.
11
The Durbin-Watson statistic test was utilized to test for autocorrelation. In all of the models, the DurbinWatson statistic increased such that the value was closer to two (the mean value for the Durbin-Watson statistic).
As a result, the inclusion of an AR(1) component decreased the uncertainty that autocorrelation is not present.
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Panel Model Results
This section presents and interprets the model results, including a discussion of
differences between the anticipated and realized impacts (specifically, the direction) of
each variable. Two models were developed to determine the impact of the acquisition
reform efforts and the external variables on schedule growth—one for schedule growth of
development programs and one for schedule growth of production programs.
Model 1: Schedule Growth of Development Contracts
As mentioned in Chapter II, most of the research concerning schedule growth
addresses the growth in the development phase of the acquisition process. The dependent
variable in this model is the average annual schedule variance (in percentage terms) per
service for the development programs in the DAES database from 1980 to 2002. This
variable is depicted in Figure 1 below. The schedule growth values for the Navy have
two distinct peaks in the mid-1980s and the early-1990s. Both the Army and the Air
Force have peaks in the late-1980s (and 1990).
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Figure 1: Schedule Growth of Development Contracts (1980-2002)
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Table 2: Regression Results for Schedule Growth of Development Contracts
Development Schedule Growth Panel Model
Fixed-effects Regression
Robust Standard Errors
Group Variable(i): Service
Coefficient
Variable
C
-1.039
R&D Budget (CY06 $B)
0.160
Proc. Budget (CY06 $B)
0.094 †
Unexpected Inflation
0.413 ***
Packard
0.393
90s Reforms
-0.370
2000 Revision
-1.048 †
War
1.074 †
AR(1)
0.537 ***
F-statistic
12.118 ***
Number of Obs
66
Number of Groups
3
R-squared
0.688
Adjusted R-squared
0.631
Durbin-Watson stat
1.670
***statistical significance at 0.01 level,
** 0.05 level, * 0.10 level, † 0.20 level

t-Statistic
-0.962
0.677
1.652
2.794
0.453
-0.310
-1.398
1.418
4.359

The results of the panel model are presented in Table 2 above. 12 The first
variables of interest concern the research and development and procurement budgets.
Changes in the research and development budget do not have a statistically significant
relationship with the schedule variances (used to measure schedule growth) of the
development contracts. On the other hand, procurement budgets have a positive,
statistically significant relationship with schedule growth of development contracts. The
magnitude of this relationship (as measured by the coefficient), however, is not very

12

This research first evaluates the contemporaneous conditions by not including any lagged variables; however,
alternative model specifications including lags were also examined to see the impacts of their inclusion in the
model. The optimal lag lengths determined by the lowest the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) were three
years for the budget variables, Packard, and the 1990s reforms. The 2000 revision had a one year lag and war
had no lag. All of the same variables as in the original specification were statistically significant to at least the
0.20 level except unexpected inflation became no longer statistically significant.
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large. The results suggest a 10 billion dollar (constant year 2006) increase in the
service’s procurement budget would increase schedule growth by only about one percent.
This considerable amount of budget growth represents an approximate sixty percent
increase in the procurement budget for the Army based on the mean for the sample.
Unexpected inflation has a positive, highly statistically significant relationship
with schedule growth of development contracts. The results state a one percent value for
unexpected inflation (such as if inflation was estimated to be 2.5 percent but actually was
3.5 percent) would increase schedule growth of development contracts by four-tenths of a
percent, holding all other variables constant.
Two of the four binary (dummy) variables have a statistically significant
relationship with schedule growth in this specified model, including major contingency
operations (war) and the 2000 revision of the DoD 5000 series of regulation concerning
the DoD acquisition process. The results indicate major contingency operations (and the
corresponding large deployments and budget impacts) increase schedule growth on
development contracts by a little over one percent. In addition, the 2000 revision resulted
in an approximate one percent reduction in schedule growth. Both of these variables
agree with the theorized impacts based on the existing research. On the other hand, the
other two variables representing the presence of the reform efforts did not have
statistically significant relationships. 13

13

An alternate model specification utilizing percent change in the budget variables did yield a slightly
statistically significant (to the 0.20 level) for both the 90’s reforms and war. War has roughly the same
coefficient as in the original specification (1.16) and the 90’s reforms has a fairly large negative coefficient
of -2.05 (see Appendix E for results). However, the budget variables and unexpected inflation were no
longer significant to even the 0.20 level and the overall model lost explanatory power.
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The evaluation of schedule variances in dollar terms is not as useful as the
evaluation of cost variances (used often in cost overrun/growth research). That is, it does
not necessarily imply an impact to the overall program schedule (in terms of completion
dates and changes in program length/duration) of the same magnitude as the calculated
schedule variance. 14
Model 2: Schedule Growth of Production Contracts
The dependent variable in this model is the average annual schedule variance (in
percentage terms) per service for the production programs in the DAES database from
1980 to 2002. This variable is depicted in Figure 2 below.
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Figure 2: Schedule Growth of Production Contracts (1980-2002)

14

The one instance it does is if the schedule variance refers only to the efforts on the program’s critical
path. The actual impact to the program’s schedule may be either more or less than calculated percentage
schedule growth depending on what planned efforts of the program had yet to be completed.
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The values appear to vary more for the production contracts than the development
contracts, especially for the Army. This fluctuation is primarily the result of the low
number of production contract entries for the Army in the DAES database (an average of
34 per year versus 94 for the Air Force and 125 for the Navy). 15
The results of the panel model are presented in Table 3 below. Unlike the model
for development schedule growth, none of the budget variables have a statistically
significant relationship with production schedule growth. Conversely, unexpected
inflation remains statistically significant in the procurement contracts model with a
greater magnitude positive relationship with schedule growth than in the development

Table 3: Regression Results for Schedule Growth of Production Contracts
Procurement Schedule Growth Panel Model
Fixed-effects Regression
Robust Standard Errors
Group Variable(i): Service
Coefficient
Variable
C
4.386 *
R&D Budget (CY06 $B)
-0.079
Proc. Budget (CY06 $B)
0.023
Unexpected Inflation
0.783 *
Packard
-0.468
90s Reforms
-1.207
2000 Revision
-1.020 †
War
0.726
AR(1)
0.475 ***
F-statistic
8.348 ***
Number of Obs
64
Number of Groups
3
R-squared
0.612
Adjusted R-squared
0.538
Durbin-Watson stat
2.212
***statistical significance at 0.01 level,
** 0.05 level, * 0.10 level, † 0.20 level

15

t-Statistic
1.680
-0.393
0.423
1.807
-0.394
-0.811
-1.327
1.028
2.890

The lower number of entries for the Army is likely the result of having fewer major acquisition programs
in production in general and even fewer programs receiving earned value data, which is often not obtained
on fixed-price production contacts.
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contracts model. The results indicate a one percent level of unexpected inflation would
lead to a 0.78 percent increase in schedule variances on production contracts, holding all
other variables constant.
Only one of the four binary (dummy) variables has a statistically significant
relationship with schedule growth in this specified model, which is the 2000 revision of
the DoD 5000 series of regulation concerning the DoD acquisition process. 16 The 2000
revision resulted in a one percent reduction in schedule growth, which agrees with the
theorized impact based on the existing research. On the other hand, the other two
variables representing the presence of the reform efforts did not have statistically
significant relationships. In addition, the dummy variable representing the major
contingency operations (i.e., war) did not have a statistically significant relationship with
schedule growth of procurement contracts.
Summary
This chapter described the analysis used to evaluate the impact of acquisition reform
efforts and other, external factors on schedule growth of major defense acquisition programs
(MDAP). The panel model was first described in general terms. Then, the regression results
of the empirical models were presented and discussed. The models evaluated schedule
growth for both development and production contracts of the MDAPs. The next chapter
furthers the evaluation of the empirical results and their possible policy implications.

16

An alternate model specification akin to the one described in the development panel model was also
generated for the production contracts. The only variables to become statistically significant in this revised
specification were the war dummy variable and the percent change in the development budget (significant
to the 0.20 level). Both unexpected inflation and the 2000 revision dummy variable remained consistent in
both the magnitude of the coefficient and the level of statistical significance.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
This chapter further examines the results from Chapter IV through their
application to the research objectives identified in the introduction (Chapter I). That
section is followed by a discussion of the major findings of this research. Finally,
recommendations for future research are presented.
Research Objectives
The primary purpose of this research was to perform an empirically rigorous
study of the impacts of acquisition reform efforts and other, external factors on
acquisition schedule growth that was lacking in the existing literature. Entries from the
DAES database representing both development and production contracts for all three
services from 1980 to 2002 were utilized to build an empirical (panel) model in order to
evaluate the effectiveness of acquisition reform efforts on limiting schedule growth in the
development of major DoD weapon systems. In order to isolate the influences of the
reforms, this research addressed the extent to which factors external to the acquisition
process are related to schedule growth, specifically defense budget changes (budget
instability), unexpected inflation, and contingency operations.
Discussion of Results and Research Objectives
This section applies the results from Chapter IV to the research objectives,
including a discussion of potential conclusions concerning the objectives based on the
results of the empirical models. The combined results of both panel models—the
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development contracts model and the production contracts model—are shown in Table 4
below.
Table 4: Results of the Panel Models
Development Schedule Growth Panel Model
Procurement Schedule Growth Panel Model
Variable
Coefficient
t-Statistic Variable
Coefficient
t-Statistic
C
-1.039
-0.962
C
4.386 *
1.680
R&D Budget (CY06 $B)
0.160
0.677
R&D Budget (CY06 $B)
-0.079
-0.393
Proc. Budget (CY06 $B)
0.094 †
1.652
Proc. Budget (CY06 $B)
0.023
0.423
Unexpected Inflation
0.413 ***
2.794
Unexpected Inflation
0.783 *
1.807
Packard
0.393
0.453
Packard
-0.468
-0.394
90s Reforms
-0.370
-0.310
90s Reforms
-1.207
-0.811
2000 Revision
-1.048 †
-1.398
2000 Revision
-1.020 †
-1.327
War
1.074 †
1.418
War
0.726
1.028
AR(1)
0.537 ***
4.359
AR(1)
0.475 ***
2.890
***statistical significance at 0.01 level, ** 0.05 level, * 0.10 level, † 0.20 level

Budget Instability
This research did not obtain results consistent with the previous research that
suggests reduction in budgets (a proxy for budget instability) would lead to a schedule
slip (and therefore, schedule growth) (McNutt, 1998:276). McNutt’s study addressed
schedule impacts of development programs identified through the use of a survey
instrument (vice contractual data) and the budget stability referred to the program’s
development budget. In addition, his research examined programs of varying sizes and
not just the major weapon systems (as in this research). This research did not find that
changes in a service’s research and development budget impacts schedule growth of
either procurement or development contracts. This lack of a relationship is perhaps the
result of major defense development programs tending not to have their development

41

budgets dramatically reduced unless the program is terminated. 17
Changes in the procurement budget, however, do appear to have a statistical
relationship with schedule growth for development programs. While the literature does
not address procurement budget stability as a source of development schedule growth, a
possible explanation may that increased production budgets likely correspond to larger
acquisition programs (including development) that are more complex (and likely more
costly). These larger, more complex development programs are more likely to
experience schedule growth (Rodrigues, 2000:10). While the changes in the procurement
budget may capture this potential relationship with schedule growth, a more appropriate
measure that is not included in the empirical model that may explain this relationship is
technical complexity (or technical maturity).
Unexpected Inflation
While Smirnoff (2006) did not find a statistical relationship between unexpected
inflation and cost overruns, the postulated rationale was that the lack of a relationship
may be due to tradeoffs of reduced performance requirements or extended schedules.
Based on the results of the empirical result, the latter appears to be the case. This
research found that unexpected inflation impacts schedule growth in both development
and production contracts. That is, when faced with a level of inflation greater than the
forecasted amount (a positive value for unexpected inflation), both development and

17

The same cannot be said regarding production budget profiles, which are often significantly larger than
the development budgets and change more dramatically as a result of reduced quantities to procure and/or
due to other (often political) factors.
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production programs experience increased schedule growth. For example, one percent
level of unexpected inflation would result in a 0.4 percent increase in schedule growth for
development contracts and 0.8 percent increase for procurement contracts, holding all
other variables constant. This increase in schedule growth signifies an increase in work
that was not accomplished as planned. This level of schedule variance in the contracts
likely corresponds to an extension in the program’s schedules (such as, completion and
milestone dates) to perform the missed work.
Contingency Operations (War)
The existing research presents conflicting theories on the potential impact of
major contingency operations on schedule growth. One side suggests contingency
operations require systems to be fielded sooner, especially those in or near production, so
that the capability is available to the war fighting personnel (McNutt, 1998:40). The
other side suggests contingency operations drive funding needs that contribute to budget
instability in the programs not identified as contingency requirements (Czelusniak and
Rogers, 1997:59). While the war dummy variable was not statistically significant in the
procurement contracts model, it was significant in the development contracts model. In
this model, the existence of a major contingency operation increased schedule growth on
development contracts by a little over one percent. Therefore, the results of the
production model agree with the theory presented in Czelusniak and Rogers (1997) that
the budget instability generated by contingency operations leads to worsened program
performance in terms of schedule growth. In addition, while a handful of programs may
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be fielded sooner than expected in order to support contingency operations, the majority
of programs are not. 18
Acquisition Reform Efforts
After accounting for the impacts of changes in the defense budget, unexpected
inflation, and contingency operations on schedule growth, the results were primarily
inconclusive regarding the impact of the acquisition reforms efforts on schedule growth.
The existing research suggests the reforms utilized in the empirical model had the
greatest potential to impact schedule execution. These acquisition reforms include the
Packard Commission (1986), the National Performance Review (1993) and Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, and the revision of the DoD 5000 series in 2000.
This research did not find a statistical relationship between the implementation of
the Packard Commission’s recommendations and initiatives and schedule growth of
either production or development contracts. Similar inconclusive results were obtained
regarding the implementation of the 1990s reform efforts in the 1996 revision of the DoD
5000 series. The 2000 revision of the DoD 5000 series, which included several initiatives
aimed at controlling cost and schedule (specifically, evolutionary acquisition), has a

18

This assertion is made based on a visual examination of the schedule milestones contained in the
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) of the major defense acquisition programs from 1997 to 2005.
Programs that require quicker fielding tend to have this reduced duration from the initiation of the program.
As a result, the corresponding reports would not indicate a reduction in schedule, because the reduced
schedule is the baseline for that program. For example, the schedule for the Army’s Stryker program is
perceived to have been advanced due to contingency requirements. The first SAR reflecting the approved
program based on the Milestone II Review (in Nov 2000) already has a combined development/production
(low rate initial production) decision with a threshold date of January 2003 for the first unit equipped. The
actual first unit equipped date was actually later in March 2003. If the program had been advanced, it
would be expected that this date would be sooner than initially planned and definitely before the threshold
date. This, however, is not the case.
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statistically significant relationship with schedule growth of both development and
procurement contracts. Furthermore, this research found the 2000 revision reduced
development schedule growth by 1.05 percent and procurement schedule growth by 1.02
percent. This result agrees with the research suggesting the potential benefits of some of
the initiatives implemented in the 2000 revision, particularly evolutionary acquisition,
which places greater emphasis on controlling requirements and fielding more mature
technologies versus lengthy developments involving new and/or unproven technologies
(GAO, 2006:1).
The lack of a relationship with schedule growth for the bulk of the reform efforts
likely indicates these reforms were not effective at limiting scheduling growth; however,
they also did not result in increased schedule growth. This inefficiency at limiting
schedule growth may be due to the shortfalls in the policies enacted as part of these
reforms, but more likely are from not fully implementing the recommendations and
initiatives into the DoD acquisition processes. McNutt contended that, despite
implementation by the DoD, the recommendations of the Packard Commission on
schedule execution were not widely internalized and appeared to have been unsuccessful
(1998:50). The results imply that this might have been the case not only for the Packard
recommendations but also for subsequent reform efforts.
Significance of Research
This study fills the void in the existing literature of an empirically rigorous study
of the factors contributing to schedule growth. In particular, several studies have
examined the impacts of reform efforts/initiatives on cost overruns (Christensen et al.,
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1998; Holbrook, 2003; Smirnoff, 2006), but none have yet to study the impacts on
schedule growth. Similar deficiencies exist in the literature concerning the impact of
unexpected inflation and contingency operations (war) on schedule growth. As a result,
this research can form the basis for future research involving empirical analyses of the
schedule execution of defense weapon system programs.
Recommendations for Future Research/Policy Considerations
Based on the results of this research, this section presents a few policy
considerations concerning schedule growth of major defense acquisition programs. The
first policy consideration is for greater resources to be devoted to forecasting inflation,
considering its significant impact on schedule growth in both development and
procurement efforts. The second policy consideration concerns accounting for the effects
of contingency operations (war) on development schedule growth in the costs for future
contingency operations. These costs may be calculated using the cost-of-delay analysis
method in McNutt (1998) that considers the additional operations and sustainment costs
for the additional time the system to be replaced has to remain in service and multiplier
(or efficiency) costs/savings that are lost due to the delay in the fielding of a weapon
system/capability. The final consideration is to place greater emphasis on the
implementation of the recommendations and initiatives set forth in the acquisition
reforms. A 2006 GAO study supported this assessment, pointing to the issue of the DoD
allowing programs to enter into system development with immature technologies as a
sign that the DoD had yet to fully institutionalize the revised (evolutionary) acquisition
approach (2006:12).
46

Recommendations for future research follow two general paths: performing a
similar analysis using a different dataset and examining different factors to see their
impact on schedule growth. Future research concerning the first group includes utilizing
the same method on individual program data using either earned value data (as per this
study) in the DAES reports or using schedule milestones found in the Selected
Acquisition Reports (SARs). This type of analysis allows for greater evaluation of
schedule impacts based on type of weapon system and other programmatic
characteristics. In addition, the existing dataset can be expanded to more recent years to
discern any changes in the results while allowing for an analysis of more recent
phenomena, such as changes in the organizational structure of Air Force program offices
(System Wings, Program Executive Officer consolidation/movement).
Additionally, other studies can utilize a similar method to evaluate the impact of
other factors on schedule execution. The other factors could include personnel
characteristics, including education level, acquisition training, and the number in a given
job (e.g., cost analysis). Another possible study concerns the evaluation of the common
assumption that schedule growth leads to cost growth or vice versa. Finally, a study
could be performed comparing the earned value data in the DAES to that of the schedule
milestone data (in month/year form) found in the schedule section in either the DAES or
SAR reports. This study will analyze to what extent changes in the earned value data are
reflected in the current estimates for completion of schedule milestones.
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Appendix A: Summary of DAES Data
Example Entries
Table 5 below provides an example of a few entries in the DAES database. The
specific areas utilized in this research were the year, budgeted cost for work performed
(BCWP), and budgeted cost for work scheduled (BCWS). The sample entries reflect the
DAES entries corresponding to the May 25, 2002, DAES submissions for those
programs.
Table 5: DAES – Sample Entries
SUBMITDATE
5/25/2002
5/25/2002
5/25/2002

Contract ID
F0862698C0027
DAAH0199C0121
DAAH0199C0154

Service
Air Force
Army
Army

5/25/2002

N0001997C0069

Navy

5/25/2002
5/25/2002
5/25/2002
5/25/2002
5/25/2002
5/25/2002
5/25/2002
5/25/2002

N0002499C5110
N39997993754
N0002496C2304
N0002496C2305
N0002497C5178
N0002498C2306
N0002498C2307
F0470197C0044

Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Air Force

5/25/2002

F3365701C4600

Air Force

5/25/2002
5/25/2002
5/25/2002

F3365701C4601
DAAH0198C0033
F0863500C0101

Air Force
Army
Air Force

5/25/2002

F0862696C0002

Air Force

5/25/2002
5/25/2002
5/25/2002
5/25/2002

N0001995C0120
F1962800C0023
F1962897C0001
F1962898C0003

Navy
Air Force
Air Force
Air Force

5/25/2002

F0470100C0006

Air Force

5/25/2002
5/25/2002
5/25/2002

F0470196C0025
N0002496C5337
N0001998C0177

Air Force
Navy
Navy

Program Name
AMRAAM (AIM-120A)
ATACMS BLK II
ATACMS BLK II
Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC)
Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC)
DD(X) Destroyer
DDG 51
DDG 51
DDG 51
DDG 51
DDG 51
GBS
Global Hawk Unmanned
aerial Vehicle
Global Hawk Unmanned
aerial Vehicle
GMLRS Upgrade Missile
JDAM
Joint air to surface Standoff
Missile (JASSM)
Joint standoff weapon
(JSOW)
JSTARS
JSTARS
JSTARS
Navistar Global Positioning
system (GPS) II Modern
Navistar Global Positioning
system (GPS) II Modern
SM 2 (BLKS I-IV)
Tactical Tomahawk Missile
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ACWP
135.2
130.4
122.1

BCWP
128.9
115.6
102

BCWS
130.2
123.7
106.3

BAC
179.8
124.6
132

Program
Phase
Development
Production
Development

93.3

95.7

96.1

107.9

Development

131.1
140
935.8
1067.7
432.8
831.2
865.9
186.2

132.2
137.4
850.5
968.3
448
747.7
851
186.8

132.8
141.5
858.1
979.6
452.1
780.6
912.4
187.3

149.9
172.4
926.7
1021.1
772.2
1849.7
2599.7
187.9

Development
Development
Production
Production
Production
Production
Production
Development

7.9

8

8.2

83.7

Development

3.5
125.2
27.4

3.5
122.9
29.5

3.4
124.9
29.9

90.3
135.6
0

Production
Development
Development

312.5

295.8

299.6

334.3

Development

198.2
108.5
293.7
143.7

190.6
123.1
336.8
168.9

191.5
122.2
337.4
169.3

203.2
207.3
358.1
202.3

Development
Production
Production
Production

50.5

49.8

49.5

51.2

Development

152
80.4
347.8

144
78
346.6

154
78.4
346.9

443
82.1
307.1

Development
Production
Development

Programs
The following tables list the major defense acquisition programs comprising the
dataset analyzed in this research. 19 Table 6 lists the Army programs and the number of
contract entries in the overall DAES data. Table 7 lists the Air Force programs. Table 8
lists the Navy programs.
Table 6: Army Programs
Number of Contract Entries
Research &
Program Name
Development Procurement
ABRAMS Tank M1/M1A1
11
35
ADDS
27
41
Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures
25
0
AFATDS (ATCCS)
49
0
AH-64 Apache
25
97
Army TACMS
65
0
ASAS (ATCCS) Block IIB III
32
17
ATACMS BLK II
94
10
BFVS A3 Upgrade
29
0
BFVS M2 M3 (Bradley Fighting Vehicle
4
47
CH-47 Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F)
13
0
CH-47D Chinook
1
0
Comanche Reconnaissance Attack Helicopter (RAH-66)
37
0
COPPERHEAD
0
5
CSSCS
0
21
FAAD C2I
61
0
FAAD NLOS Fiber Optic Guided-Missile
7
0
FBCB2
0
3
GMLRS Upgrade Missile
13
0
IAV (Stryker)
6
0
Javelin
30
24
JSTARS Common Ground Station (CGS)
26
0
Laser Hellfire
28
58
Longbow Apache FCR
73
0
Longbow Hellfire
0
21
M1A2 Abrams Upgrade
10
0
MCS IV
23
0
MLRS
45
4
MLRS-TGW
40
0
PATRIOT
72
120
Patriot PAC-3
91
9
PERSHING II
21
69
ROLAND
0
20
RPV (AQUILA)
68
0
SADARM
71
16
SCAMP
10
0
SGT YORK GUN (DIVAD)
0
31
SINCGARS
36
0
STINGER
29
56
STINGER RMP
0
56
TACIT RAINBOW (JGL)
3
0
TOW 2
19
0
UH-60A/L Black Hawk
0
32

19

As mentioned in Chapter III, the earned value data detailed in the DAES entries for these programs were
accumulated for the year and added with the other programs for that service in that specific year.
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Table 7: Air Force Programs

Program Name
ACM
AFATDS
ALCM
AMRAAM (AIM-120A)
ASAT
ATS
B-1 CMUP-DSUP
B-1B
B-1B CMUP
B-2A
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program ((C-130 AMP)
C-17A
CSRL
DMSP
DSCS III A&B
DSP
E-3 AWACS RSIP
E-3A
EF-111A
EJS
F-22A Raptor
F-15
F-16
GBS
GLCM
Global Hawk Unmanned aerial Vehicle
Inertial Upper Stage
IR Maverick
I-S/A AMPE
JDAM
JGL Tacit Rainbow
Joint air to surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)
Joint Primary training aircraft (JPATS) (T-45)
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
JSIPS CIGSS
JSTARS
KC-135R
MARK XV IFF
MILSTAR
Minuteman III Guidance replacement Program (MMIII
Minuteman III Propulsion replacement program (MMII
Navistar Global Positioning system (GPS) II Modern
OTH-B (Radar)
Peacekeeper
PLSS
Rail Garrison
Sensor Fused Weapon
Small ICBM
SMART-T
Space based infra red surveillance system (SBIRS)
SRAM T AGM 131A/B
T-46A
Titan IV

50

Number of Contract Entries
Research &
Development Procurement
35
31
2
0
8
24
92
83
66
10
20
0
2
0
110
255
58
0
5
10
2
0
128
99
14
9
40
136
21
15
87
207
59
0
0
33
0
9
13
0
91
0
15
62
37
130
17
0
12
11
1
1
0
14
9
34
13
0
30
0
27
0
16
0
24
64
25
0
9
0
79
102
0
42
33
0
32
17
38
21
22
31
84
98
0
52
198
494
17
0
48
0
28
50
234
0
20
0
25
0
17
0
24
10
11
18

Table 8: Navy Programs

Program Name
5-INCH GUIDED PROJECTILE
A-12
Aim-9X Short range air to air missile
AN/BSY-1
AN/BSY-2
AN/SQQ-89
AN-APG-79 Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar
AOE 6
ASPJ (AN/ALQ-165)
AV-8B Harrier II
C/MH-53E
CG 47 Aegis Cruiser
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
CVN 68
DD(X) Destroyer
DDG 51
E-2C Computer Upgrade
EMSP
F/A-18 C/D
F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet
F-14D
FDS
FFG-7
HARM (NAVY)
Joint standoff weapon (JSOW)
JTIDS (NAVY)
LAMPS MKIII
LCAC
LHD-1
LPD-17
LSD 41 CARGO VAR
LSD 41 Class CV
MCM 1
MH-60R
MH-60S
MHC 51
MIDS-LVT
MK 48 ADCAP
MK 50 Torpedo
NATO PHM
Navy Area TMBD
NSSN New Attack Sub
P-7A
PHALANX CIWS (MK-15)
Phoenix (AIM-54C)
ROTHR
SEA LANCE
SEALIFT
SIDEWINDER (AIM-9L) (Navy)
SIDEWINDER (AIM-9M) (Navy)
SM 2 (BLKS I-IV)
SPARROW (AIM-7M) (Navy)
SSN 688 Attack Sub
T-45TS
TACTAS
Tactical Tomahawk Missile
T-AGOS
T-AO 187 OILER
Tomahawk R/UGM-109
TRIDENT II MSL
TRIDENT II SUB
TRIDENT SUB
USMC H-1 Upgrades
V-22 Joint services advanced vertical lift aircraft
Virginia Class Sub SSN 774
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Number of Contract Entries
Research &
Development Procurement
9
0
9
0
21
0
63
0
26
0
53
87
2
0
0
73
0
33
10
7
7
0
0
153
39
14
0
66
3
0
28
433
63
0
12
0
21
37
69
60
0
6
60
0
0
28
27
5
52
9
15
0
21
5
0
155
0
151
0
45
0
26
0
24
0
31
62
6
9
0
0
112
43
0
0
46
38
33
1
11
66
4
63
104
6
0
0
6
0
16
3
0
26
0
0
123
2
0
1
0
29
69
0
14
35
203
16
5
1
1
14
0
0
20
0
26
65
114
79
187
0
154
0
19
17
0
117
88
0
84

Appendix B: Summary of Independent Variables and Summary Statistics
Procurement and Development Budgets
Figures 3 and 4 below show the procurement and development budgets for the Army,
Air Force, and Navy between 1980 and 2002. These budget figures reflect the Total
Obligation Authority values detailed in Chapter 6 of the National Defense Budget Estimates
for 2006 (also known as the FY2006 Greenbook). The values presented throughout this study
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Figure 3: Procurement Budgets from 1980-2002 (CY06 $B)
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Figure 4: Research & Development Budgets from 1980-2002 (CY06 $B)

Unexpected Inflation
The estimates of future inflation rates are presented in Chapter 5 of the National
Defense Budget Estimates section included in the annual President’s Budget submission.
Figure 5 depicts the levels of expected inflation and actual inflation for each year from 1980
to 2002. Table 9 provides the calculated values for unexpected inflation for that time period.
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Figure 5: Expected and Actual Inflation Rates from 1980-2002
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Table 9: Unexpected Inflation from 1980-2002
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

Expected
Actual
Unexpected
Inflation (DoD) Inflation (DoD)
Inflation
5.9%
11.7%
5.8%
8.1%
10.4%
2.3%
8.9%
7.5%
-1.4%
6.3%
3.6%
-2.7%
3.7%
3.0%
-0.7%
4.5%
3.3%
-1.2%
4.0%
2.6%
-1.4%
3.4%
2.9%
-0.5%
4.5%
3.6%
-0.9%
3.4%
3.9%
0.5%
3.0%
3.0%
0.0%
4.0%
4.6%
0.6%
2.9%
1.9%
-1.0%
3.7%
2.9%
-0.8%
2.0%
2.3%
0.3%
2.2%
2.0%
-0.2%
2.8%
2.2%
-0.6%
2.6%
2.2%
-0.4%
2.2%
2.3%
0.1%
2.0%
2.2%
0.2%
2.2%
2.5%
0.3%
2.8%
3.0%
0.2%
3.0%
2.7%
-0.3%

Summary Statistics
Table 10 below provides the summary statistics for the continuous variables
utilized in this research. The values reflect the entire range of data from 1980 to 2002 for
all three services. The amount of schedule growth appears to vary more in procurement
contracts, including values reflecting periods where the programs of one service were
ahead of schedule on average for that year (that is, a negative schedule growth value).
Table 10: Summary Statistics
R&D Schedule Growth (percent)
Proc. Schedule Growth (percent)
R&D Budget ($ billion)
Procurement Budget ($ billion)
Unexpected Inflation (percent)

Obs.
69
68
69
69
69

Mean
3.25
3.76
11.70
28.09
-0.08
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Median
2.91
2.60
10.35
25.64
-0.30

Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
9.84
0.47
2.20
17.94
-2.01
3.86
22.61
5.89
4.60
61.31
7.90
14.06
5.80
-2.70
1.57

Appendix C: Tests for Stationarity of Dependent Variable
In order to minimize the possibilities for spurious correlations, the dependent
variable used in the panel regression model must be stationary. In this research, the
dependent variables are the schedule growth percentages of procurement and
development contracts in the DAES database for each service in each year. The
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test was utilized in this study to test for the presence of a unit
root; the values are Tables 11 and 12 below. All of the p-values for the tests are less than
α=0.05, except for that of the Air Force’s research and development contracts, which has
a p-value less than α=0.15. This value might have impacted some of the findings in this
research; however, the value is still relatively low and the other two services had lower
(more ideal) p-values. This is confirmed in the Levin, Lin and Chu test for common unit
root test (values in Table 13) with both the procurement and development contract entries
having p-values less than α=0.05. As a result, the null hypothesis (of a unit root) can be
rejected and it can be concluded that the schedule growth data reflect a stationary
process.
Table 11: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Development Contracts
Percent Schedule Growth - Research & Development Contracts
Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root

Number of
Obs
22
Z(t)-Air Force
p-value for Z(t) =

Z(t) has t-distribution
1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-2.528
-1.725
-1.325

Test
Statistic
-1.076
0.1474

Z(t)-Army
p-value for Z(t) =

22

-2.877
0.0047

-2.528

-1.725

-1.325

Z(t)-Navy
p-value for Z(t) =

22

-1.81
0.0427

-2.528

-1.725

-1.325
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Table 12: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Procurement Contracts
Percent Schedule Growth - Procurement Contracts
Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root

Number of
Obs
22
Z(t)-Air Force
p-value for Z(t) =

Z(t) has t-distribution
1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-2.528
-1.725
-1.325

Test
Statistic
-2.233
0.0186

Z(t)-Army
p-value for Z(t) =

20

-3.147
0.0028

-2.552

-1.734

-1.33

Z(t)-Navy
p-value for Z(t) =

22

-2.482
0.011

-2.528

-1.725

-1.325

Table 13: Common Unit Root Test Results for Schedule Growth
Levin, Lin & Chu Test for Common Unit Root

Number of Obs
R&D Contracts
64
Proc. Contracts
58

56

Test
Statistic
-1.68588
-3.44782

Prob.
0.0459
0.0003

Appendix D: Tests for Stationarity of Continuous Independent Variables
In addition to testing for stationarity of the dependent variable, unit root tests (same
as in Appendix C) were also performed on the continuous independent variables (budgets and
unexpected inflation) utilized in this research. The results of the individual Augmented
Dickey-Fuller Tests are provided in Tables 14-16. Unexpected inflation has very significant
test statistics for both the individual and common unit root tests, indicating a stationary
process. In addition, the research and development budgets appear to reflect a stationary
process (p-values less that α=0.10 for the individual unit root tests and around α=0.10 for the
common unit root test). The procurement budgets appear to have a greater possibility for a
non-stationary process with p-values around α=0.20. The transformation of the budgets into
percentage change from previous year seems to correct any issues with non-stationarity in
both the procurement and development budgets. That is, the p-values for both the individual
and common unit root tests are less than α=0.01. The results of these tests for the
transformed budget variables are provided in Tables 18-20. In accordance with this
adjustment, regression results utilizing these transformed budget variables are provided in
Appendix E.

Table 14: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Development Budgets
Research & Development Budget (CY06 $B)
Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root

Number of
Obs
Z(t)-Air Force
22
p-value for Z(t) =

Z(t) has t-distribution
1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-2.528
-1.725
-1.325

Test
Statistic
-2.371
0.0139

Z(t)-Army
p-value for Z(t) =

22

-1.651
0.0572

-2.528

-1.725

-1.325

Z(t)-Navy
p-value for Z(t) =

22

-1.497
0.075

-2.528

-1.725

-1.325
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Table 15: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Procurement Budgets
Procurement Budget (CY06 $B)
Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root

Number of
Obs
22
Z(t)-Air Force
p-value for Z(t) =

Z(t) has t-distribution
1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-2.528
-1.725
-1.325

Test
Statistic
-0.817
0.2119

Z(t)-Army
p-value for Z(t) =

22

-0.754
0.2299

-2.528

-1.725

-1.325

Z(t)-Navy
p-value for Z(t) =

22

-0.804
0.2153

-2.528

-1.725

-1.325

Table 16: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Unexpected Inflation
Unexpected Inflation (%)
Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root

Number of
Obs
Z(t)-Air Force
22
p-value for Z(t) =

Z(t) has t-distribution
1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Value
Value
Value
-2.528
-1.725
-1.325

Test
Statistic
-6.01
0

Z(t)-Army
p-value for Z(t) =

22

-6.01
0

-2.528

-1.725

-1.325

Z(t)-Navy
p-value for Z(t) =

22

-6.01
0

-2.528

-1.725

-1.325

Table 17: Common Unit Root Test Results for Budgets & Unexpected Inflation
Levin, Lin & Chu Test for Common Unit Root
Test
Statistic
Prob.
Development Budget (CY06 $B)
-1.248
0.106
Procurement Budget (CY06 $B)
-0.762
0.223
Unexpected Inflation (%)
-7.315
0.000
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Table 18: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Percent Change of
Development Budgets
Percent Change - Research & Development Budget
Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root
Z(t) has t-distribution
Number of
Obs
22
Z(t)-Air Force
p-value for Z(t) =

Test
Statistic
-2.664
0.0075

1% Critical
Value
-2.528

5% Critical 10% Critical
Value
Value
-1.725
-1.325

Z(t)-Army
p-value for Z(t) =

22

-3.277
0.0019

-2.528

-1.725

-1.325

Z(t)-Navy
p-value for Z(t) =

22

-3.059
0.0031

-2.528

-1.725

-1.325

Table 19: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results for Percent Change of
Procurement Budgets
Percent Change - Procuremnt Budget
Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root
Z(t) has t-distribution
Number of
Obs
22
Z(t)-Air Force
p-value for Z(t) =

Test
Statistic
-2.589
0.0088

1% Critical
Value
-2.528

5% Critical 10% Critical
Value
Value
-1.725
-1.325

Z(t)-Army
p-value for Z(t) =

22

-2.72
0.0066

-2.528

-1.725

-1.325

Z(t)-Navy
p-value for Z(t) =

22

-3.141
0.0026

-2.528

-1.725

-1.325

Table 20: Common Unit Root Test Results for Percent Change of Budgets
Levin, Lin & Chu Test for Common Unit Root
Test
Statistic
% Change - R&D Budget
% Change - Proc. Budget
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-3.874
-2.769

Prob.
0.0001
0.0028

Appendix E: Alternative Specification for Panel Model
This section provides regression results for the schedule growth panel models
utilizing a slightly altered specification for the models, which can be found in Table 21. That
is, percent change of the budget variables were used in place of the constant year 2006 dollar
figures utilized previously (in the body of this study). This altered specification results in
fewer statistically significant variables in the model for schedule growth of development
contracts. In addition, the development model explains less of the variation in the schedule
growth data (an adjusted r-squared value of 0.568 versus 0.631). On the other hand, the
procurement model has more statistically significant variables and the revised model explains
more of the variation in the schedule growth data (from 0.538 to 0.555).

Table 21: Alternative Model Specification Regression Results
Schedule Growth Panel Models
Development
Procurement
Variable
t-Statistic
t-Statistic
Coefficient
Coefficient
C
4.436 ***
3.353
3.943 ***
4.586
% Change - R&D Budget
-4.6E-05
-0.002
0.039 †
1.380
% Change - Proc. Budget
0.0087
0.717
0.022
1.004
Unexpected Inflation
0.269
0.912
0.841 *
1.878
Packard
-0.542
-0.453
-0.192
-0.212
90s Reforms
-2.049 †
-1.549
-1.247
-1.145
2000 Revision
-0.777
-1.160
-1.365 †
-1.391
War
1.160 †
1.531
0.930 †
1.602
AR(1)
0.631 ***
4.813
0.500 ***
3.222
F-statistic
9.554 ***
8.867 ***
Number of Obs
66
66
Number of Groups
3
3
R-squared
0.635
0.626
Adjusted R-squared
0.568
0.555
Durbin-Watson stat
1.652
2.206
Fixed-Effects
Yes
Yes
Robust Standard Errors
Yes
Yes
***statistical significance at 0.01 level, ** 0.05 level, * 0.10 level, † 0.20 level
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